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Since 1998, the European Union (EU) has begun to develop a Common European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which provides a stronger role in the security and 
defense areas in order to become a more important actor in these fields. Since that time, 
the member states of the European Union have been pursuing their capabilities to conduct 
conflict prevention and crisis management operations, with no intention of overcoming 
NATO’s role and capabilities in the field of collective defense, but with the intention of 
strengthening the Union’s role and influence in international politics. 
This thesis demonstrates that a common European Security and Defense Policy is 
vital for the future of the European Union. The need for a common policy is more urgent 
than ever because only in this manner can the European Union be strong and significant. 
This thesis identifies and analyzes the origins of this concept, shows how the current 
situation has increased that demand, and explains the reasons for the establishment of 
ESDP. The thesis concludes with an evaluation of these ideas and policy 
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Since 1998, the European Union (EU) has begun to develop a Common European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which provides a stronger role in the security and 
defense areas in order to become a more important actor in these fields.  Since that time, 
the member states of the European Union have been pursuing the capabilities to conduct 
conflict prevention and crisis management operations, with no intention of overcoming 
NATO’s role and capabilities in the field of collective defense, but with the intention of 
strengthening the role and influence of the Union in the arena of international politics.  
All member states of the Union would like to become an equivalent part of NATO and 
not to remain simply auxiliary members, and this is important, with no intention of 
becoming antagonistic to the alliance.  It must be very clear that the common desire of 
the member states of the European Union is to remain the ESDP’s ally and not a foe of 
NATO’s structure and policy.  
Is a common European policy about security and defense necessary for the 
European Union’s future?  How could all these developments become a reality in the 
dangerous post-Cold war environment?  What effect will the Common European Security 
and Defense Policy have on trans-Atlantic relations in security matters?  
For a better understanding, it is necessary to answer questions such as what are 
the origins of the idea for a common “European Army,” what defense organizations exist 
now in Europe, and why are all these organizations insufficient for European security.  
What is the role of European Union’s ESDP in the 21st century in view of the threats and 
the challenges that the Union confronts, what policy regarding the establishment of the 
Common European Security and Defense Policy should Greece adopt.  Greece as a 
member of NATO and the EU is in an extreme geographical position among three highly 
sensitive continents as well as in a place where all future developments will have great 
importance for the rest of the world, for its future and progress? 
All these questions must be answered so the decisions makers can understand 
exactly the importance of the ESDP for the future of Europe and the European Union, 
and also for relations between NATO, the EU and the United States.  
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Therefore, this thesis demonstrates that a common European Security and 
Defense Policy is vital for the future of the European Union.  The need for a common 
policy is more urgent than ever because only in this manner can the European Union be 
strong and significant.  This thesis identifies and analyzes the origins of that idea, shows 
how the current situation has increased that demand and explains the reasons for the 
establishment of ESDP.  The thesis concludes with an evaluation of these ideas and 
policy recommendations for a member state, for Greece, and for the European Union 
itself. 
The challenges that the EU faces today results in one completely clear and 
concrete policy: a policy that can solve all the major problems that emerge daily in all 
countries.  The Maastricht Treaty was implemented to acknowledge all these demands. 
The EU through that treaty took a major step forward in the future construction of the 
European edifice.  European Union’s structure was established on three fundamental 
pillars: 1) community, 2) common foreign and security policy, and 3) justice and home 
affairs.  No single pillar in such a system can function properly without some support 
from one, or often all, of the other pillars.  Clearly, each pillar in the system affects the 
others, and by extension, the European Union. 
Security and defense have become global and the European Union has the 
responsibility to play a significant role in that very important battlefield.  Therefore, 
creating a framework to pursue a common foreign and security policy among the 
members is essential.  That policy should be complemented with a common defense 
policy and a common defense in order to become credible, effective, and capable of 
facing the new threats and challenges that emerged after the Cold War.  The European 
security and defense policy should be developed and be complementary rather than 
countering the Atlantic Alliance and NATO must remain the main element of the 
European security system.  
Chapter I examines the historical background of that particular case and the 
historical origins of the idea of a common “European Army” during the last centuries in 
Europe.  It also explains the concept behind a common “European Army,” where and 
when the concept initially took shape.  How was that idea developed, how did it coincide 
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with the Napoleonic Army at the beginning of the 19th century and how did it develop 
until the end of WWII?  Finally, what happened in Europe concerning this idea, and what 
happened with the idea of a common security and defense policy in Europe after the end 
of WWII until the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty on a European Union in December of 
1991? 
By answering all these questions, it will be clear that the concept of a common 
European Security and Defense Policy is an old idea, an idea that dates back to ancient 
times, and it is an idea that is extremely important to the future of Europe. 
Chapter II provides a list of today’s existing security and defense organizations in 
Europe and other security and defense structures at the core of the EU.  It also discusses 
the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western 
European Union (WEU), and finally the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE).  It is essential to verify and to discover whether all the other existing 
security organizations in Europe are sufficient for European security and the reason a 
new security institution or a new security and defense organization is so important for 
Europe’s future and its new significant international role.  This chapter explains why 
eventually the existence of all these security and defense structures and organizations did 
not help very much when a serious problem emerged, a problem that demanded common 
strategies and common positions, such as the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the beginning 
of the 1990’s.  If one can understand the problems and the shortcomings of the other 
security structures, one can agree to the establishment of the Common European and 
Security Defense Policy. 
Chapter III analyzes the role of the European Security and Defense Policy on the 
threshold of the 21st century and explains the historical background of the developments 
associated with the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) since the end of 
the Cold War.  This chapter also examines the institutional framework and the main 
objectives of that policy, the challenges and the demands for European Union at the 
threshold of the 21st century, and eventually, the effectiveness and the need for one 
common European security and defense policy.  This chapter explains the reasons for the 
capabilities gap created between the EU and NATO, what contributed to that huge 
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disparity, and the steps and the solutions that the ambitious European Union must adopt 
in order to decrease that capability vacuum and to thus become an equal member of the 
alliance and an appreciable power in international affairs.   
If these factors are clarified, one can understand the major role of a common 
European security and defense policy for the future of the European Union and how 
necessary the ESDP is for further European integration. 
Chapter IV clarifies Greece’s place in the new era, its geopolitical and 
geostrategic position, its national strategy, and the threats that confront the contemporary 
international environment.  Since Greece, as a European, Mediterranean, and even a 
Balkan country, has had its share of troubled history in South-East Europe, hopefully the 
nation is, at the beginning of the 21st century, in a much better position than all its 
neighbors, economically, politically and socially.  Thus, Greece constitutes an important 
factor in the democratic and economic reforms of the countries of Southeastern Europe 
on their way toward stabilization the European security architecture.  
Due to challenges that resulted from the disputes among the great powers for the 
best policies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Greece feels deeply anxious about 
its future and its sovereign rights and looks forward to the safeguarding of peace and 
stability in this very dangerous region.  Such safeguarding can be achieved, in one sense, 
by establishing and deploying a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
This is the reason the ESDP is so important and extremely vital to the future existence of 
Greece.   
Finally, this thesis concludes with the evaluation of the above ideas, which will 
help to clarify the debate and will make the European Union’s policy understandable 
along with Greece’s policy concerning this extremely crucial issue.  
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II. ORIGINS OF THE IDEA FOR A COMMON “EUROPEAN 
ARMY” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers have dreamed of a united Europe for centuries.  However, it was not 
until the Second World War that a genuine and responsible movement toward European 
integration began.  The main speculation, at that time was how to establish a more united 
Europe after a hellish war had created a major rift among the European countries, and 
left, in its wake, intense hatreds and economic catastrophe.1  
Nonetheless, the notion of Europe as one community with common values is not a 
new concept that appeared for the first time during the second half of the 20th century.  
On the contrary, it is a very old idea.  
Actually, the notion dates back to antiquity, more specifically to the Roman 
Empire. Certainly, the idea has always coincided with the emergence and development of 
only one great power on the European continent.  The emergence of one ruling empire in 
Europe always raised the issue of one united Europe, under the sway of the most 
powerful nation.  As if according to some natural law, in almost every century, a 
powerful country power seems to emerge, possessing the intellectual and moral impetus 
to shape the entire international system to its own values.2  Since a common foreign and 
security policy must, like any other such policy, rest ultimately upon military force this 
vision, of one united Europe, engenders the idea for one common European army: an 
army responsible for the security and defense of all Europe.   
Charles, King of the Franks, known as Charlemagne, who became the supreme 
ruler of Western Europe when crowned Emperor on Christmas Day in the year 800 AD,3 
rose from such a power vacuum and the lack of such an army after the fall of Romulus 
Augustulus in 476 AD.  Eventually, Charlemagne’s attempts were not successful, but he 
was the ancestor of Napoleon and Napoleon’s aspirations in the 19th century for one 
                                                 
1 Ronald Tiersky, Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p. 241. 
2 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone Book, New York, 1994, p. 17. 
3 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 4. 
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united European empire with one common army.  Even though France was not the ruling 
power at that time in Europe, during the 17th century, under Cardinal Richelieu, a new 
approach toward international relations, followed by Great Britain in the 18th century and 
Metternich’s Austria and Bismarck’s Germany in the 19th century, reshaped European 
power and diplomacy.4   
Therefore, what exactly was the idea behind a common “European Army,” where 
did it begin and how far back in the European history did this idea occur?  How was that 
idea developed and how did it coincide with the Napoleonic Army at the beginning of the 
19th century and how did it develop until the end of the Second World War?  Finally, 
what happened in Europe concerning this idea, and what happened with the idea of a 
common security and defense policy in Europe after the end of WWII until the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty on European Union in December of 1991? 
Answering all these questions, clarifies the concept of a common European 
Security and Defense Policy, an old idea, dating back to ancient times, an idea that is still 
extremely important to the future of Europe. 
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN ANCIENT TIMES 
Undoubtedly, the first force that could claim to possess the title of a common 
European army was the Roman army, and in particular, the Roman Legions.  From early 
times until the 3rd century A.D., the Roman army was based on its legions, which were its 
core.  The Roman army was composed of these units called legions from the Latin legio, 
meaning a levy.5  
In the early Republic, the legion of the Roman army was a self-contained 
formation equivalent to a complete army itself.  During the first three centuries of the 
empire, from 25 to 34 legions existed.  Each of these units consisted of approximately 
4,000 to 6,000 men recruited from among the citizen body, and even though the soldiers 
of the legion were Roman citizens, this did not mean that they were from the city of  
                                                 
4 Henry Kissinger, p. 4. 
5 G. R. Watson, The Roman Soldier, Thames & Hudson, 1969, p. 21. 
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Rome or even from Italy.6  Due to the spread of the legions among the population of 
conquered territories, people from all these remote provinces became the most important 
source of recruits.  
Each legion had its own name, number and badge, to which honorary titles could 
be added.  The numbering and naming of legions did not follow a logical pattern and 
several legions carried identical numerals or nicknames.  The legion was organized in ten 
cohorts, each of which consisted of three manipuli, which in turn was subdivided in two 
centuriae.7  The title of the leader of the legion was legatus whose appointment was for 
three years and his staff officers numbered six officers, called tribuni.  The commander 
usually was picked by the emperor from the senatorial class who had served as Praetor, 
and in general, had prior military experience through service as a tribunus.  The most 
important officers in the legions were the centuriones, men who were partly recruited 
from the Roman knights or the city council members, but the majority of the centurions 
had previously served as soldiers and NCOs in the legion or the praetorian cohorts.  They 
were the backbone of the legion, responsible for implementing training and discipline in 
their companies.  
A legion consisted of a heavily armored infantry and the personal weapons for 
everyone were two javelins and a short thrusting sword.  Additionally, the legion had two 
types of spring-operated artillery, a light field gun and a large catapult.8 
The conditions of service varied from period to period, so there were periods 
when the minimum term of service was sixteen years, and other times when a legionary 
had to serve 25 years or more before being able to retire.  
The most important element for the success of the legions, and the Roman army 
in general, was its legendary discipline, according to their oath “…to follow the consuls 
to whatever wars they may be called, and neither desert the colors nor do anything 
contrary to the law.”9  Most historians agree that their success was primarily due to the 
                                                 
6 Ibid, p. 22. 
7 Ibid. 
8 H. E. L. Mellersh, Soldiers of Rome, Robert Hale Ltd, London, 1964, pp. 38-39. 
9 Ibid, p. 98. 
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stiff discipline imposed on every rank.  Discipline was the root of morale and personal 
responsibility and unit drills obtained it.  However, in the later days of the empire, 
discipline apparently relaxed, the main reason being that the army was now a volunteer 
army.  
Rome’s army remained unequaled for centuries. After their collapse in 476 A.D., 
almost four hundred years had to pass before another dominant leader could attempt to 
create such an empire, and an army for all of Europe.  That leader was Charlemagne, or 
Charles the Great, King of the Franks and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.  “By the 
sword and the cross,” he became master of Western Europe.  Through his enlightened 
leadership, order was restored to Medieval Europe.  By 800 A.D., Charlemagne was the 
undisputed ruler of Western Europe.  His vast realm encompassed what are now France, 
Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands.  It included half of present-day Italy and 
Germany and parts of Austria and Spain.  By establishing a central government over 
Western Europe, Charlemagne restored much of the unity of the old Roman Empire and 
paved the way for the development of modern Europe.  
However, the Roman Empire that Charlemagne attempted to resurrect could not 
survive.  Even without the disputes over the succession among Charlemagne’s heirs, the 
empire was certain to be dissolved.  The haste with which he had grabbed the Roman 
crown excluded any true empire in Europe in the foreseeable future because an attempt 
had been made to assume an imperial style of government far beyond the economic, 
judicial and technical resources, which disintegratory forces took on enduring forms of 
their own.10  Besides, all the successor states of the continent were designed against the 
imposing ancient glamour of the universal Roman state.  
One of the major ironies of history is that the reconstruction of the Roman Empire 
was, in fact, the collection of states that created modern Europe.11  One thousand more 
years had to pass for another unique man of history, another genius to appear and to 
continue that long-term undertaking of Charlemagne to integrate Europe and to develop 
one common army.  That unique man was, without a doubt, Napoleon Bonaparte.   
                                                 
10 Hagen Schulze, p. 5. 
11 Ibid., p. 4. 
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C. FROM NAPOLEON’S ARMY TO WAFFEN SS 
As the Spanish historian Diez del Corral has mentioned, “the genius of Napoleon 
had already been frustrated a thousand years in advance by the phenomenon of 
Charlemagne.”12 
Napoleon Bonaparte is the embodiment of the right man at the right time.  
Certainly, the reforms in the French army had already begun.  The crucial point was the 
disaster during the Seven Year’s war in 1763.  Before then, the French army was like all 
others armies in Europe in that the nobility dominated the officer corps and enlisted 
soldiers were recruited primarily from the lower classes and often joined to escape 
poverty, unemployment, and sometimes the law.  These soldiers felt little loyalty to the 
crown and desertion was a severe problem.  
However, after the disaster of 1763, the government called for an increase in light 
infantry, which later led to efforts to train conventional infantry in light infantry tactics, 
and thus created a soldier who could fight in either close or open order.  For the artillery 
corps, the numerous gun calibers were reduced to four.  New guns were introduced that 
were lighter and more mobile than their predecessors and featured standardized parts and 
packaged rounds.13 
However, the most important change was the innovation that came after the 
French Revolution: the policy of universal conscription, which led to a great increase in 
the number of soldiers.  This fact gave new weight to the French foreign policy and 
provided the opportunity for French commanders to fight more campaigns, more 
aggressively. To be sure, they were also more costly.14  The commanders began to 
combine two or more demi-brigades with supporting artillery under a single commander, 
thus forming a division.  This led to the formation of permanent divisions.  The division 
could march and fight independently as well as be part of a greater force.  This meant that 
commanders could seize the opportunity to wage battles quickly if the opportunity arose.   
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 6. 
13 David Gibson, Napoleon and Grande Armée, Available at [http://www.napoleonseries.org], January 
12, 2003. 
14 Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to Nuclear Age, Princeton University 
Press, 1986, p. 124. 
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The independence engendered by the divisional structure allowed contact battles where 
divisions could be thrown into the fray as they came on-line rather than forcing 
commanders to wait until their full force was deployed.15 
In a sense, it was a stroke of luck that placed Napoleon in command of the 
Grande Armée.  It was clear that Emperor Napoleon was head of the Nation as well as the 
Grande Armée, an excellent position for any commander, with the resources of the state 
at his disposal.  Napoleon gave to those great army elements of his genius, elements that 
made the army one of the most efficient armies ever.  The emperor had understood very 
clearly that every age has its own strategy, which when put into practice, embodied the 
army with his passion for speed, maneuver, surprise, and offensive.  Beyond these 
characteristics, Napoleon also emphasized the need to maintain the initiative, to 
concentrate forces, and to economize effort while maintaining morale.  That army 
became the reflection of Napoleon’s beliefs for absolute victory and rejection of limited 
wars for limited goals. These were beliefs and attitudes that made the army capable of 
prevailing in Europe in a very short period of time, surprising everyone.  In the fall of 
1813, the war plan for the various allied armies in central Europe advised the direct 
withdrawal of any army against which the Grande Armée advanced.16 
Many people believe Napoleon’s army was ahead of its time, in terms of 
effectiveness, strategy and tactics. For many people that army was the most characteristic 
example of a common European army. 
Since Napoleon, no other nation dominated in Europe to such a degree as to 
prevail in most of these areas and to be able to create an army, which might be the one 
and only army for Europe.  This did not occur again until Nazi Germany began the 
Second World War in 1939.  During that period in Germany, many of the characteristics 
of a European army existed. These characteristics were the exact ambitions of its 
creators. 
In December 1940, Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS (Schutz Staffeln), 
established the Waffen-SS.  This new army grew rapidly and within six months grew to 
                                                 
15 David Gibson. 
16 Peter Paret, p. 134. 
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over 150,000 men.  By October 1944, the Waffen-SS had grown to over 600,000 men.17  
The Waffen-SS, which is translated as “Armed-SS,” was the military wing of the black 
uniformed SS (Schutz Staffeln, or Defense Squads) and became the equivalent of regular 
army divisions.  Its conceptual origins lay in the “political ready reserves” in the early 
days of the Nazi movement.  These reserves were the fanatical Nazis who would protect 
the party leaders and ruthlessly attack all enemies during the political chaos of Germany 
in the 1920's and '30's.  
It is important to distinguish that serving in the Waffen-SS (a military 
organization with foreign troops and conscription) was not the same as membership in the 
SS (a Nazi political organization and executive arm for racial Germans), although the two 
concepts are confused.  The Waffen-SS was expected to be a military organization 
absolutely and perfectly obedient and loyal to its master, Adolf Hitler, and even though 
there is no indication that the Waffen-SS were going to replace the entire army after the 
assassination attempt on Hitler (C. Stauffenberg), the goal was to reconstruct the entire 
army command on the basis of the SS leadership after the war.18  The Waffen-SS 
recruited many foreign volunteers into its ranks.  After the May 1940 “Victory in the 
West,” the SS began an active program to obtain Western European recruits for several 
new Waffen-SS volunteer legions.  This effort intensified after June 1941, as the SS 
asked volunteers to join the “anti-Bolshevik” campaign in the Soviet Union and over 
125,000 West Europeans volunteered for the Waffen-SS. 
The great irony and contradiction for the Waffen-SS was that the military force 
created as the ultimate racial elite, during the last days of the war, recruited large 
numbers of non-German, volunteers from northern, western and eastern Europe,19 
because the racial standards were increasingly ignored as the German war fortunes 
declined and the Waffen-SS was in desperate need of manpower. 
                                                 
17 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, p. 
373. 
18 Ibid., p. 373. 
19 Ibid., p. 373. 
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Eventually, the defeat of Germany by the Allies had catastrophic results on 
German plans for one European army, and Hitler’s and Himmler’s plans ended up being 
a complete disaster. 
D. THE IDEA FROM THE END OF THE WWII TO MAASTRICHT 
Just after the end of WWII, many countries in Europe had believed that European 
unity would keep them safe from the Soviet threat, a threat that would be more dangerous 
in case the United States’ forces, according to the statements of its President’s Roosevelt, 
could not remain in Europe for more than two years after the war.20  In addition, one of 
the most fervent supporter of the idea for European unity was Winston Churchill, who 
declared in 1946, that  
the first step in the recreation of the European family must be a 
partnership between France and Germany.  The structure of the United 
States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single 
state less important.  The fighting has stopped.  But the dangers have not 
stopped.  If we are to form a United States of Europe or whatever name it 
may take, we must begin now.21 
As a result of this development, the Treaties of Dunkirk (1947), and mainly of 
Brussels (1948), took shape, and had as a goal, the establishment of a security 
community, which would eliminate any further prospects of war. 
Even the United States, as stated by President Eisenhower, agreed with the idea of 
European unity.  As Eisenhower declared in 1951:  
I believe in it this much, when I came over here I disliked the whole idea 
of a European Army, and I had enough troubles without it.  However, I 
have decided that it offers another chance for bringing another link here, 
so I made up my mind to go into the thing with both feet. So I am going to  
try to help, and I realize that a lot of my professional associates are going 
to think I am crazy. But I tell you that joining Europe together is the key to 
the whole question.22 
Therefore, discussions and deliberations among the countries of Western Europe, 
led to the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community (EDC), in Paris on 27 
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May 1952.  It was an attempt by the six Western European nations of France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg to create a European Army for the 
common defense of their territory against a Soviet threat.  The United States and the 
United Kingdom were involved as principal observers and the Soviet Union played the 
role of principal critic.  
The aim of the military side was creating of a European Army with a homogenous 
unity, structure and administration.  That result could ensue in two phases.  The first was 
the passage of national contingents to a European Army at the same time as the creation 
of the first German units, and the second, the progressive integration of training and 
administration, leading to a fusion of European divisions and European reserves, which 
would be accompanied by controlled central recruitment and basic training.23 However, 
the demands of sovereignty and the deep complexity of the European security problems, 
such as early German rearmament and the need for a transatlantic alliance, destroyed that 
first attempt at defense integration.  
Unfortunately for Europe, one more attempt did not have the desired outcome and 
just two years later, in 1954, it ceased to exist.  Responsibility and blame for the failure 
rested on many, and actually had no importance whatsoever.  What was important was 
that one more chance for all of Europe had been missed as a result of national priorities.  
Also, after that dramatic development, the subject of defense in the context of Europe 
was taboo for almost forty years.    
However, in May 1992, the creation of Eurocorps by France and Germany at the 
beginning, came to “disturb the stagnant waters” for a common European defense.  The 
creation of the corps by France and Germany symbolized a fundamental reconciliation 
and cooperation between two historical enemies.  France and Germany wanted to use the 
Eurocorps to enable the WEU to act according to the orders of the EU by helping defend 
NATO territory, in peacekeeping activities outside the NATO area, and in humanitarian 
operations.  Their components are drawn from the five-member states of France, 
Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Luxemburg and they comprise 60,000 troops.24  Both 
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NATO and the WEU can make use of the Eurocorps.  Additionally, Great Britain agreed 
to commit 20,000 troops to that force, to be drawn mainly from its NATO Rapid 
Reaction Force. France would probably contribute the same number of troops, Germany 
offered 18,000 and Spain 6,000 men.  
The Eurocorps consists of the following military units:25 
• The EUROCORPS (European Corps) 
• The Multinational Division (Central) 
• The UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force 
• The EUROFOR 
• The EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force) 
• The Headquarters of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps 
• The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 
Actually, this was the first attempt at the idea of European defense integration, 
after what happened in the 1950s.  Also, that attempt simultaneously, with the new 
aspects created after the Maastricht Treaty regarding the second pillar of the European 
Union, gave new impetus to the idea of a common “European Army,” of a common 
European Security and Defense Policy.    
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III. DEFENSE STRUCTURES IN EUROPE 
During the Cold War, alliances formed along ideological lines, and the areas of 
greatest concern for the military planners were those of confrontation between U.S.-led 
NATO and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact.  Since the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, these areas have lost much of their strategic significance, 
and other regions have gained increased attention.  However, the end of that bipolar 
system, contrary to many people’s expectations, did not result in a secure environment 
numerous conflicts erupted in the former Soviet Union’s “democracies” and in the 
Balkans.  Therefore, since the end of the Cold War, one of the central debates between 
the United States and European countries is the importance of security in post-Cold War 
Europe and the establishment of a defense structure to ensure security within Europe. 
Following the Second World War and until the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Europe was accustomed to living under the umbrella of the United States against the 
threat of the Soviet bloc.  During that period, the U.S. dominated European security 
militarily.  While Western European countries focused on ensuring security and stability 
through economic development.  Following the Cold War, Western European countries 
developed into a powerful economic group, and the European Union (EU) member states 
were interested in developing of a Common European Security and Defense Policy 
(CESDP) to give the EU one strong voice in world affairs. 
To better grasp the current situation, one must be familiar with the other European 
defense organizations.  One must also understand what other security and defense 
structures are at the core of the EU.  Once the structure of these organizations is 
understood, it is imperative to ask whether these existing security organizations are 
sufficient or insufficient for European security and the reason a new security institution 
or a new security and defense organization is so important for Europe’s future and its 
new significant role in the international arena. 
Only in this manner will decision makers understand the problems and the 
shortcomings of the other security structures and agree to the establishment of the 
Common European and Security Defense Policy. 
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A. THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (UNO) 
The name “United Nations,” coined by the United States President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, was first used in the “Declaration by United Nations” of 1 January 1942, 
during the Second World War when representatives of 26 nations pledged their 
Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers.   
The forerunner of the United Nations was the League of Nations, an organization 
conceived in similar circumstances during the First World War, and established in 1919 
under the Treaty of Versailles “to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace 
and security.”  The International Labor Organization was also created under the Treaty of 
Versailles as an affiliated agency of the League.  The League of Nations ceased its 
activities after failing to prevent the Second World War. 
The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when 
China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and a 
majority of other signatories ratified the Charter.  Preserving world peace is the central 
purpose of the United Nations, and under the UN Charter, member states are to settle 
disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of military force against 
other states. 
The relevance of the UN Charter to the North Atlantic Alliance is twofold.  First, 
it provides the juridical basis for the creation of the Alliance, and second, it establishes 
the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and 
security.26 
From 1949 until today, the formal link between the United Nations and the North 
Atlantic Alliance has remained constant, and contacts between the two organizations 
were limited, both in scope and in content.  However, the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia changed the entire situation as a number of measures were taken, including 
joint maritime operations, NATO air operations; and close air support for the United 
Nations Protection Force.  
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In addition to these conflicts, in the face of other threats to world peace, NATO 
countries, while not directly involved as an Alliance, have lent their support to the 
attempts of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General to prevent conflict 
and restore the rule of international law.    
Two other significant and important components of the UN are the following:27 
• The General Assembly, which is the main deliberating body of the United 
Nations, is composed of representatives of all member states, each of 
which has one vote.  Decisions on important issues such as peace and 
security require a two-thirds majority, while decisions on other, less 
important issues, require only a simple majority.  
• The Security Council is the body that according to the UN Charter has the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  Under international law, the Security Council alone has the 
power to authorize the use of force against one state and decisions such as 
these are legally binding to all member states.  The Security Council 
consists of five permanent members and ten members elected by the 
General Assembly.  Only permanent members can veto Security Council 
resolutions.     
B.  NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) 
After the Second World War, Western European countries and their North 
American allies viewed with concern the expansionist policies and methods of the USSR.  
Between 1947 and 1949, a number of serious political events created chaos.  These 
included direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece and Turkey and other 
Western European countries, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, and the illegal 
blockade of Berlin, which began in April of the same year.28  Negotiations begun among 
five European countries, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, led to the Brussels Treaty of March 1948, with the United States and Canada 
desiring the final goal of creating a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security 
guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America.  The invitation 
of five more countries led to the creation of NATO.  The North Atlantic Treaty 
establishing NATO was signed in Washington in April 1949, by the twelve foreign 
ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
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Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Britain and the U.S.29  Greece and Turkey acceded to the 
Treaty in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982.  In March 1999, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland became members of NATO.  In accordance with Article 
10 of the Treaty, the alliance remains open to accession by other European states in a 
position to further its principles and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area.   
The Treaty created an alliance for collective defense as defined in Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter and led to the formation of NATO.  The organization now 
links much more independent nations in a voluntary security system in which roles, risks 
and responsibilities are shared.  The Treaty commits each member country to sharing the 
risks and responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security and requires each of 
them to not enter into any other international commitment that might conflict with the 
Treaty.30 
Key changes and innovations undertaken by NATO since 1989 include the 
adoption of a new strategic concept and increased coordination and cooperation with 
other international organizations such as the UN, OSCE, WEU and EU. 
The new strategic concepts of 1991, also established the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council in December 1991, and expanded and intensified political and 
military cooperation in Europe through the Partnership for Peace program, launched in 
January 1994.31  The concept combines a broad approach to security based on dialogue 
and cooperation with the maintenance of NATO’s collective defense capability. It brings 
together political and military elements of NATO’s security policy and establishes 
cooperation with new partners in central Europe as well as in the former Soviet republics. 
It provides for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and introduces major 
changes in NATO’s integrated military forces, including substantial reductions in their  
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 29. 
30 Ibid., p. 30. 
31 Ibid., p. 67. 
18 
size and readiness, improvements in mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different 
contingencies, increased use of multinational formations, creation of a multinational rapid 
reaction force, and adaptation of defense planning arrangements and procedures.     
Also, in contrast to previous relations between NATO and the former USSR, a 
Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security has tried to improve their 
relations.  The creation of Permanent Joint Council provides for regular meetings 
between both parties and has helped to change their previous hostile relations. 
Moreover, NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North 
America is permanently tied to the security of Europe and the means by which the 
Alliance carries out its security policies including the maintenance of a sufficient military 
capability to prevent war and to provide for an effective defense and overall capability to 
manage crises affecting the security future of its members.32    
Between the establishment of the Alliance and present day, more than half a 
century has passed.  For much of this time, the central goal and focus of the Alliance was 
to provide almost everything for the immediate defense and security of its member 
countries.  This goal remains its main task even today, but its immediate focus has 
advanced to a fundamental choice.   
C. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 
(OSCE) 
The idea of a pan-European security conference was raised by the Soviet Union in 
the 1950’s.  In the mid 1960’s, the Soviet Union, taking advantage of détente and more 
frequent exchanges between the East and West, proposed the convening of a European 
security conference, which would confirm the existing borders in Europe and would 
pronounce the framework for large scale East-West economic cooperation.33  The former 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was founded on July 3, 1973 
in Helsinki. Initially, the CSCE was a political process aimed at defining the fundamental 
principles needed to ease tensions between the East and West, and by building confidence  
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among members of the blocs.  After the Cold War, the CSCE was institutionalized into 
an all-inclusive European security organization.  Today it consists of 55 members, which 
is all the European states including Canada and the United States. 
The CSCE was unique for many reasons.  In an era characterized by bloc-to-bloc 
confrontation, it had a wide membership of all states and full equality.  At a time when 
most negotiations adopted a piecemeal approach to security, the CSCE endorsed a 
comprehensive and cooperative approach to security.  Decisions were made by 
consensus, and in this manner, the decision-making process was very important.  
Decisions were politically rather than legally binding and were thus very flexible.  
Finally, as the CSCE had no institutional structures, the very impetus needed to keep the 
process advancing was an end in itself.34  To clarify, the concept of cooperative security 
presupposes non-hegemonic behavior on the part of participating states.  It requires a true 
partnership based on mutual accountability, transparency and confidence on both the 
domestic and the foreign policy level.    
The collapse of Communism, symbolized by the removal of the Berlin Wall, 
dramatically transformed European security, and with it, the CSCE.  Having opened a 
new era of democracy, CSCE participating states could look forward to a brighter future, 
but still had to overcome the legacy of the past.  The CSCE assumed new responsibilities 
and challenges in that period of transition, characterized by institutionalization, the 
strengthening operational capabilities and developing of field activities.   
Eventually, the CSCE was renamed OSCE at the Budapest Summit in December 
1994, and the organization was intended to develop into a primary instrument for early 
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation “from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok.”  The expectation was that the OSCE could provide a 
framework for security cooperation in Europe, which includes the United States, Europe 
and the Russian Federation. 
The OSCE has an unusual status because on the one hand, it has no legal status 
under international law and all its decisions are politically but not legally binding.  On the  
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other hand, it possesses most of the regular attributes of an international organization.  
Most of its instruments are framed in legal language, and furthermore, the fact that OSCE 
commitments are not legally binding does not detract from their efficacy.35 
The basic priorities of the OSCE today are 
• to consolidate the common values of the participating States and assist in 
building fully democratic civil societies based on the rule of law; 
• to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war-torn 
areas; 
• to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation 
of new political, social or economic divisions by promoting a cooperative 
system of security.36 
The last OSCE Summit of Istanbul in November 1999 determined a security 
concept of Europe in the 21st century, aiming to strengthen the organization.  The OSCE 
continues to provide active and direct support where needed for promoting democracy, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights throughout the OSCE area.  In many of its 
activities, the OSCE comes into contact with other international and non-governmental 
organizations and consequently, increased priority is being given to inter-institutional 
cooperation and coordination. 
D. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU) 
The Western European Union (WEU) was first established as a mutual assistance 
commitment with the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, developed into a security organization for 
cooperation in defense and security and today includes ten member states, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, all of which are both NATO and EU members.  The foundation of 
WEU was partly a way to justify an American commitment to the defense of the 
continent and partly a means to accomplish a European defense effort.37 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 3. 
36 Ibid., p. 17. 
37 Stuart Croft, John Redmond, G. Wyn Rees and Mark Webber, The Enlargement of Europe, 
Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 89. 
21 
After having served as a mere forum for consultation in the previous decades, it 
experienced a period of reactivation in the mid 1980’s.  The WEU was reactivated in 
1984 with a view to developing a “common European defense identity” through 
cooperation among its members in the security field and strengthening the European 
pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance.38  The NATO secretary general is invited to all 
WEU ministerial meetings while practical measures of cooperation include joint meetings 
of the councils of NATO and WEU.     
WEU goals, under the Hague platform on European security interests agreed upon 
in October 1987, were to develop a more cohesive European defense identity, which 
would translate more effectively into following the obligations of solidarity, to which 
members are committed in the framework of the WEU and NATO. It was within the 
context of the WEU that the Petersberg Tasks in Bonn were agreed upon in July 1992.  
According to the decisions at Maastricht with the Treaty on the European Union, and at 
Petersberg, advanced steps were undertaken to develop the WEU’s operational 
capabilities in order to provide the organization with the necessary tools to undertake the 
Petersberg missions.  
Under these circumstances, a WEU Planning Cell was created to complete 
planning for possible WEU operations.  The WEU has no standing forces or command 
structures of its own.  Therefore, the military units and command structures designated by 
WEU members and associate members can be made available to the WEU for its possible 
tasks and include both national units and several multinational formations.39 
Concerning the military tasks of the WEU, it was premature for the organization 
to be made responsible for the territorial defense of its members, and at the 1992 
Petersberg meeting of the WEU Council, it was agreed that three new types of tasks 
would be accorded priority: humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations and the 
employment of combat forces in crisis management.40  These types of conflicts were the  
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most possible to arise in the near future, were mostly low-intensity operations, within the 
capabilities of the WEU, offered the benefit of occurring outside the traditional area of 
NATO responsibility, and thus solved the possibilities of overlap. 
The missions that the WEU has conducted have been mainly low-key, low-risk 
and low-cost.  Militarily speaking, after three decades, the WEU acquired some 
significance in 1987 to 1988 in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war by going 
beyond geographical constraints.  A second incident was operational engagement during 
the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and finally since 1992, the WEU has been involved in the 
enforcement of the UN embargo on former Yugoslavia, in cooperation with the OSCE.41 
Unfortunately, it has been obvious almost to everyone that the WEU has been 
unable, in one sense, to clarify its functions and its grandiose hope that would embody a 
dynamic European defense identity has led to naught.  
Today, the objective of creating new security and defense-related bodies in the 
framework of the EU does not provide a clear answer to the question of what will happen 
with the WEU.  The goal of the Cologne declaration was to merge the WEU with the EU, 
yet on the other hand; the Helsinki material does not contain any clear indication that this 
goal is still valid.  At the same time, the reference to possible treaty amendments still 
seems to keep the door open for some sort of merger. 
E. TEETHING TROUBLES IN THE EU 
1. Yugoslavia  
Unfortunately, the existence of all these security and defense structures and 
organizations did not help very much when a real serious problem emerged, a problem 
that demanded common strategies and common positions that would define the Union’s 
political and military approach.  This problem occurred in the beginning of the 1990’s 
with the dissolution of Yugoslavia.  Therefore, the most obvious examples of military 
action that created the first indications of problems within the EU were the crisis in the 
former Yugoslavia and the operations there under the auspices of NATO.  
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With the exception of Slovenia, which tried to and managed to avoid the 
bloodshed, and to set itself on the road to membership, none of the newly independent 
Republics can claim that no better way to choose and to follow existed. 
The EC, at that moment, failed to see the long-term dangers of structural 
underdevelopment, which threaten the area.  The danger did not arise from shortcomings 
in its multiculturalism and market economy, but from the unsuccessful attempts of the 
states in the region to impose and implement law and order.  Therefore, the real fear had 
to do with the collapse of administrative mechanisms, and in areas where the state 
mechanisms had collapsed; Europe had to help to construct new and legal mechanisms.  
In the beginning, this conflict was not considered to be a case for NATO. In 
addition, officials of the European Community (EC) were sure that the crisis was a 
challenge for the EC to resolve and the U.S. administration agreed.  Luxembourg’s 
foreign minister Jacques Poos, speaking as chairman of the EC Council of Ministers, 
declared that it was “the hour of Europe, and that if one problem can be solved by the 
Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem.  This is a European country and it is not up to the 
Americans and not to anybody else.”42 
However, unfortunately, whatever Europe wanted to believe about its abilities and 
its power, the reality was very much different and worse than ever before.  The 
intervention of Europe and the attempt to implement a common and acceptable policy 
without further stating the absence of such a policy, which would lead to a resolution of 
the crisis and to the peaceful settlement and accommodation for the overall dispute, was 
never successful, and the entire situation took a different turn, deteriorated and spiraled 
completely out of control.  That development resulted in NATO, in mid-1992, to 
becoming much more interested in the conflict, which was concentrated in Bosnia, and to 
being responsible for attempts at peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement.  
The Bosnia conflict had three phases, with different engagements by NATO and 
the EU.  The first was from 1992 until 1995, when NATO had only limited roles and the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) carried out the main role on the ground, 
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composed to a large extent of European troops.  The second phase occurred during the 
summer of 1995, when the Dayton agreements called for NATO forces to assist in a plan 
to construct a single, democratic and multiethnic Bosnia and finally, the third phase, 
which began in late 1995 with NATO’s staying power.  Its mission was the 
implementation of the Dayton arrangements.43  The previous negative opinions and 
reluctance of the U.S. to become involved directly in the conflict had changed 
dramatically. Distinctive is the opinion from a few observers that “The United States 
must stay out of war in the Balkans in order to stay in Europe.”44 
From December 1995 to December 1996, NATO forces were present on the 
ground in Bosnia as part of the Implementation Force, known as IFOR, and since 
December 1996, IFOR has been replaced by another NATO-led force, the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR).45  The size of IFOR was 60,000 troops and the size of SFOR was around 
32,000 troops, with only 6,000 from non-NATO countries.46 
The next operation where NATO and the U.S. played a significant role in 
European issues was operation Allied Force in March 1999, NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo.  While non-U.S. aircraft carried out over 15,000 sorties, about 39% of the total, 
U.S. aircraft delivered over 80% of the weapons.47  Seventy-seven days into 
bombardment, over 900 aircraft had been involved in the operation and two-thirds of 
them were American, and the United States met approximately 95% of NATO’s 
intelligence requirements in the operation.48  The only area where the European 
contribution in Kosovo was greater than that of the U.S. was the size of the troops that  
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Europe had at present.  The U.S. share comprised less than 20% while the European 
troops composed 75% or more from a force of 50,000 troops49 for the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR). 
Furthermore, in the Spring of 2001, the emergence of violent clashes on the 
borders of Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) between 
ethnic Albanian extremist groups and FYROM forces led the President of the FYROM to 
request help from NATO and the international community.  The result was the 
deployment of Operation Amber Fox, with the mandate to contribute to the protection 
international monitors from the European Union and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, who were overseeing the implementation of the peace plan in 
FYROM.50 
The operation consists of approximately 1,000 troops and a large contingent from 
the EU had started and eventually led to a happy ending for the Europeans.  The latter 
troops are to take over the NATO mission in FYROM as the latest news from that front 
indicates that European troops in the beginning of April 2003 will replace the NATO 
forces there, under the auspices of the ESDP.  To turn Amber Fox into a EU-led 
operation would not be extremely difficult, given the size of the force, but it will result in 
a highly significant task for the EU, as it will be the first time that an entire operation will 
execute exclusively by EU-led forces.  
Certainly, even that small-scale operation did not receive unanimous acceptance 
from the EU.  Member states as the UK, Germany, Finland and Portugal have expressed 
their doubts and their concerns about the necessity of such a movement, thinking mostly 
about the fragile situation that exists in the broader region. 
The disaster and the failure of the policies that followed and their attempted 
implementation, especially in that crisis, was the crucial point for the future decisions of 
the European Union and for their further agreements on a Common European Security 
and Defense Policy, the Petersburg Tasks, Headline Goal, and so forth. 
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The tasks of a Common European Security and Defense Policy will be significant 
contributions to international peacekeeping, the use of military force when appropriate 
and the promotion of international cooperation, democracy and human rights.51 
The foundations for that, for the Common European Security and Defense Policy 
laid at the Treaty of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.  That was the 
treaty upon which the whole edifice of the CESDP was supported. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE EU’S ESDP ON THE THRESHOLD OF 
THE 21ST CENTURY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the European Union (EU) is confronted with 
acute challenges, demands and controversies caused by the sweeping changes that Europe 
has witnessed, especially since 1989.  The Treaty of the European Union, the Maastricht 
Treaty, in force since 1993, represented a major step forward in the construction of the 
European edifice.  Nevertheless, crises such as those in the former Yugoslavia, or more 
recently, the crisis in the Persian Gulf with Iraq, have shown that the European Union 
lacks the instruments and clearly defined objectives to deal effectively with the new 
situation that has emerged since the end of the Cold War on the continent and beyond. 
The European Union’s structure has been established on three fundamental 
pillars: 1) the community dimension, comprising the arrangements prescribed in the EC, 
ECSC and Euratom Treaties, namely, Union citizenship, community policies, the 
Economic and Monetary Union, and so forth; 2) the common foreign and security policy, 
which comes under Title V of the EU Treaty; and 3) police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, which comes under Title VI of the EU Treaty.52  No single pillar in 
such a system can function properly without some support from one or both of the other 
pillars. Each pillar in the system has an effect on the others, and by extension, on the 
overall vision of the European Union.  
Therefore, obviously, creating a framework for the common defense and security 
policy among the members is essential.  Such a framework would make the EU credible, 
effective and capable of facing the new threats and challenges that have emerged since 
the end of the Cold War.  The European Security and Defense Policy does not, however, 
affect the specific nature of the security and defense policies of certain member states, 
and this policy is also compatible with the policy and framework of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO).  The European Union’s security and defense policy should 
be developed in a way that compliments the Atlantic Alliance because NATO must 
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Surveying the history of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
since the end of the Cold War is essential.  One must also review the framework and the 
main objectives of that policy, the challenges and the demands for a European Union at 
the threshold of the 21st century, and eventually, the effectiveness and the necessity for 
one common European security and defense policy.   
With such factors in mind, one perceives how imperative the ESDP is for the 
future of the European Union and how necessary the ESDP is for further European 
integration.  From such an analysis rises the frequently asked question, “What kind of 
Europe do we want to establish?” 
As Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, declared,  
No European nation can go it alone in the world.  And if we are to play 
our part in ensuring peace, security and prosperity in Europe and beyond, 
we need a strong foreign and security policy - as a corollary to a strong 
economic presence on the world stage. We want to be successful at 
preventing the conflicts, not just good at picking up the pieces. History 
stepped in again on 11 September.  Today the need for a Common 
Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defense Identity 
is more urgent than ever.  Because the European Union cannot be strong 
without them.  And only a strong and united Europe can help bring peace 
and stability and prevent war.53    
B. DEVELOPMENT AFTER MAASTRICHT TREATY 
At Maastricht in December 1991, the EU started to form its own post-war destiny 
and started discussions about further European integration, including a defense dimension 
unique to the EU.  Maastricht set as a goal “the eventual framing of a common defense 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”54  The Maastricht Treaty 
introduced the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its main 
objectives and aims were to safeguard common values and fundamental interests,  
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strengthen the security of the Union, preserve peace and international security, promote 
international cooperation, and develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and freedoms.55 
The Western European Union (WEU), a separate defense organization which had 
been in existence since 1954, was requested “to elaborate and implement decisions and 
actions of the Union which have defense implications,”56 and would have the task of 
leading crisis management operations.  Unfortunately, the WEU never became a credible 
organization for the development of a common ESDP.  Moreover, that European Union 
nations did not have the military capabilities to meet their political ambitions either as 
part of NATO or out of the context of NATO become obvious. 
The Amsterdam Treaty went beyond Maastricht in that it provided for “the 
possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so 
decide.”57  The Amsterdam Treaty also stated “the progressive framing of a common 
defense policy will be supported, as member states consider appropriate, by cooperation 
between them in the field of armaments.”58  The Amsterdam Treaty endorsed three basic 
forms of flexibility: 1) enabling clauses, the mode of integration which enables willing 
and able member states to pursue further integration, 2) case-by-case flexibility, which 
allows a member state the possibility of abstaining from voting on a decision by formally 
declaring that it will not contribute to the decision, while accepting that the decision 
commits the entire EU (constructive abstention), 3) pre-defined flexibility that covers a 
specific field, is predefined and is automatically applicable as soon as the treaty enters 
into force.59   
Current work on the EU’s security and defense dimension was initiated at St. 
Malo in December 1998.  St. Malo is widely considered as the start of the European 
security and defense policy (ESDP) project.  Prime Minister Blair, Prime Minister Jospin, 
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and President Chirac, after the revolutionary changes in the United Kingdom’s attitude 
toward EU involvement in security and defense matters and its lifting of its decades-long 
objections to the EU acquiring an autonomous military capacity, issued a joint 
declaration aimed at addressing all the deficiencies.  
The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom agreed 
that:  
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage.  The Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.  
Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new 
risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European 
defense industry and technology.60 
Since St. Malo, progress has been comparatively rapid.  The basic approach, 
developing arrangements for the European Union to decide on military matters while 
drawing on national forces and capabilities, NATO planning support and, when 
necessary, other NATO assets, has been widely supported.  The NATO Washington 
Summit and Cologne European Council, in April and June 1999, respectively, specified 
the basic framework to implement this policy.61  At the European Council’s Cologne 
Summit in June 1999, the EU formally launched the Common European Security and 
Defense Policy (CESDP). 
Further European Councils in Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Gothenburg have 
developed this framework.  The summit at Helsinki in December 1999 built on the 
progress made in Cologne and defined new EU structures to undertake the crisis 
management role. Further issues that have been addressed include the arrangements for 
consultation between the European Union and NATO, the establishment of the necessary 
political and military structures within the European Union, and the arrangements by 
which non-EU NATO European nations as well as candidates for EU membership can be 
properly involved in ESDP operations and the civilian aspects of crisis management.  
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The summit at Nice in December 2000 also “signaled the member states’ 
determination to make the necessary efforts to improve their operational capabilities 
further, focusing on command and control, intelligence and strategic air and naval 
transport capabilities,”62 areas where the Europeans would have to rely on NATO.  
Obviously, improvements in the military capabilities of participating EU member states 
lie at the heart of these arrangements, and that will continue to be the focus of future 
work on the European Security and Defense Policy.  
The approach to improving capability in the Union has been straightforward.  
Having set an overall goal, the “Headline Goal,” at Helsinki in December 1999, the EU 
member states assessed where they collectively stood in relation to that goal and 
identified the shortfalls and what to do about them. 
More specifically, the EU Headline Goal, in terms of military capabilities, stated 
that:  
• cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must 
be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least  
one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of 
full range of Petersberg Tasks, including the most demanding, 
• these forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary 
command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other 
combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and 
naval elements, 
• modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and 
transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the 
needs of all EU members, 
• appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while 
respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU 
European members and other interested states to contribute to EU 
military crisis management, 
• a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to 
coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and 
resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the 
Union and the member states.63 
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Additionally, the EU member states agreed that they would make a serious effort 
to: 
• develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military 
means, 
• open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from 
other member states, 
• reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European 
multinational forces, 
• prepare the establishment of a European air transport command, 
• increase the number of readily deployable troops, 
• enhance strategic sealift capacity.64 
The main reason that the target of the Headline Goal was set for EU member 
states was to give them a challenging target and to encourage them to make real and 
effective improvements in their military capability. 
Furthermore, to clarify, the so-called Petersberg Tasks, on which to a large extent 
the Helsinki Headline Goal was based, were originally defined by the WEU.  They are 
described as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,65 which now are also the focus of 
the ESDP, according to the official EU website.  
Since Helsinki and the agreement on the Headline Goal, military experts from EU 
participating nations and the EU Military Staff, with assistance from NATO experts, have 
developed a statement of the forces and capabilities required.  At the Capability 
Commitment Conference of 20 November 2000 in Brussels, EU member states presented 
their national contributions to meet the EU Petersberg Tasks.  All the participating 
members, except Denmark that has chosen not to participate in the ESDP, agreed that 
their goals require: 
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• more than 500 kinds of land-, air- and naval units, as well as key or 
strategic capacities in seven areas: C3I, ISTAR, Deployability and 
Mobility, Effective Engagement, Protection and Survivability, 
Sustainability and Logistics, and General Support, 
• an 80,000-man strong land force, which would enable a force of 
60,000 to operate, 
• an air element of between 300 and 350 fighter planes, 
• a naval element of 80 ships.66 
At that conference, the contributions from the participating states exceeded the 
numbers of the Headline Goal.  The EU could have at its disposal a land force of more 
than 100,000 troops, 400 fighter aircraft and 100 ships, making the Union capable of 
carrying out with success all the kinds of missions that were possible according to its 
declarations.67 
The commitment of forces at the conference toward the implementation of the 
Headline Goal does not mean the creation of a standing “European Army.”  It is 
considered a pool of forces from which forces can be rapidly assembled for particular 
operations, with the approval of the relevant national governments.  All units available to 
the EU must be at a very high degree of readiness and equipped with modern and high 
performance equipment, which meets criteria for interoperability, sustainability and 
deployability.  According to the Helsinki Declaration it should be recalled,  
The European Council underlines its determination to develop an 
autonomous capacity to take decisions and where NATO as a whole is not 
engaged, to launch and to conduct EU-led military operations in response 
to international crises.  This process will avoid unnecessary duplication 
and does not imply the creation of an European army.68 
In Nice, the EU added “NATO remains the basis for the collective defense of its 
members and will continue to play an important role in crisis management.” 
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1. Capabilities’ Gap 
However, even today, there are many different views and ambiguities concerning 
the meaning of the ESDP.  Should it be considered a friend or a foe to NATO?  Is it 
NATO’s companion or competitor?  Ambiguities persist about the types of operations in 
which the EU is going to take part, the nature of its military actions, and even the 
geographical range of its operations.69  As one French expert in defense economics, 
Francois Heisbourg, has admitted,  
With defense spending close to 60% of America’s, the Europeans could in 
theory be expected to achieve 60% of US capabilities.  They are probably 
below 10% in the realm of strategic reconnaissance and theatre-level 
C4ISR, at substantially less than 20% in airlift capacity, and possibly at 
less than 10% in terms of precision guided air-deliverable ordnance.70 
Therefore, a widespread idea is that the EU does not possess the logistical assets 
needed to deploy the necessary military units, and simultaneously, it has neither the will 
to pay the costs of such deployments nor the capacity to develop common policies.  The 
capabilities gap between NATO and the EU, actually between the United States and the 
EU, has its origins in the past, and many reasons contributed to that problem.  
The gap has emerged for three fundamental reasons: historical demands, 
structural considerations and financial limitations.71  More specifically, during the Cold 
War era, all NATO European countries had to be prepared for a war in their regions, 
rather than to use their forces over long distances and for long periods of time.  That 
notion required the creation of heavy armies, with no airlift capacity, with no long-range 
missiles and so on.  In contrast, the United States had to be ready for a different kind of 
war in which capacities such as mobility, sustainability and the development of forces 
overseas and with no limits of time, were indispensable factors for the final victory. 
The conclusion to the Cold War, the changes in relations between the former 
rivals, and the emergence of new threats made the previous development of large 
standing armies in European countries, in one sense, useless.  Yet simultaneously these 
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fators increased the value of the American-type army, with the ability for rapid reaction 
deployment with fewer limitations on place, distance and time.  Under all these new 
concepts, European nations had to make a new start that would require time and money, 
and no one could be certain that they would be able to cover the gap between these two 
parts of the Alliance. 
Furthermore, European mentalities were not helpful for constructing a common 
European defense.  The idea of defense remains an extremely national issue, even though 
European political and economic integration has been underway for decades.  In the 
European Union, there are fifteen countries, with fifteen armies, fourteen air forces and 
thirteen navies, each with its own command structures, logistics organizations, and so 
forth.  Every nation has its own foreign and defense policy, according to its national 
interests, and the EU has, as a result, no coherence and no common strategy among its 
members, even on issues of common interest.  Defining and agreeing upon all the present 
requirements for a modern and capable defense policy is virtually impossible. 
Finally, the most important factor explaining the capabilities gap is without a 
doubt the financial factor.  Budget constraints are a daily and alarming phenomenon in 
the discussions of any improvements or changes concerning the further development of 
the common ESDP policy, which would be able to bridge the capabilities gap.  European 
Union nations collectively spend less on defense than the U.S., in absolute and relative 
terms.  The quantity and the quality of European defense spending are insufficient to 
provide for the capabilities the EU needs to fulfill its declared ambitions.  
The main reasons for this situation are generally known: the strictness of fiscal 
policies with the main goal of the European Union countries during the last decade being 
the European Monetary Union, and the budgetary constraints imposed by the Stability 
and Growth Pact, the social structure of the European Union today and the 
correspondingly different priorities of the European governments, and eventually the lack 




Owing in large part to these factors, since the end of the Cold War, the Europeans 
have cut their defense budgets by more than 16%, and on average, they spend 2.1% of 
GDP, while the U.S. spends 3%.72  Likewise, European procurement budgets have 
decreased by 18% in the last decade and the U.S. decreased only by 8%.73  Moreover, in 
future years, according to the official statements, U.S. defense budgets will increase, 
while European defense budgets will decrease or remain at the present levels at best.   
Certainly, the opposite opinion exists that the European Union does not have the 
number of commitments that the U.S. has, and that its global interests and aspirations are 
more limited than those of the U.S.  That allegation fails to recognize that geostrategic 
conditions have changed, and the European Union, in light of that new global concept, 
must undertake its responsibilities and determine its role in the international arena. 
From a different view of point, no one could claim that Europeans spend too little 
on defense.  European NATO countries still spend about $165 billion on defense 
annually,74 which is a huge amount of money, but unfortunately, the outcome from that 
expenditure is unimpressive in terms of military capability, owing to many inefficiencies 
in European budgeting and procurement practices. 
2. Challenges and Problems Created by the Gap for a Common ESDP 
Generally speaking, that capabilities gap between the EU and the United States, 
two important parts of the alliance, makes cooperation and coordination extremely 
difficult and sometimes impossible.  Many examples of these problems occurred during 
the wars in the former Yugoslavia. 
Certainly, the official policy of the U.S. is that the Americans, enthusiastically 
support any such measures that enhance European capabilities. But any initiative must 
avoid preempting Alliance decision-making by de-linking ESDP from NATO, avoid 
duplicating existing efforts, and avoid discriminating against non-EU members.75 
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Obviously, the gap has serious implications for the conduct of military operations 
as well as for transatlantic relations.  Moreover, those fundamental problems have to do 
not only with the relations between the U.S. and the EU but also with relations among the 
various EU member states.  
Madeleine Albright stated when she was Secretary of State that the first possible 
problem of de-linking had involved autonomous European action, which was introduced 
in the St. Malo declaration, along with the absence of the essential words “separable but 
not separate.”76 
Discriminating against non-EU members was important, as eight members of 
NATO - Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and 
the U.S., not forgetting the different status for Denmark - are not EU members.  All these 
countries have made clear their concerns about the implications of a military action 
within the framework of the ESDP, as it is not entirely clear to what extent the EU 
operations would be based upon NATO capabilities.  These ambiguities have heightened 
concerns about the capabilities gap because the EU developments might widen the gap 
with non-EU NATO countries.77 
The most important of these possible problems was duplication.  That meant for 
the EU’s ESDP could not spend scarce resources on trying to create the same capabilities 
that NATO possesses, as the EU countries could not use them without special processes 
and complications.78  The European Allies should not be expected to copy the U.S. armed 
forces structure, but rather to complement their capabilities, and in that way, increase 
NATO’s power and flexibility. Nevertheless, the issue of unnecessary duplication has 
continued to be at the center of transatlantic debate about the future of the ESDP and its 
relations with NATO. Further problems associated with the capabilities gap, which could 
lead to huge debates about the future of the Alliance, include divisions of labor and 
burden-sharing ambiguities.  
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The division of labor refers to the distinction between the high technology Allies 
who provide the logistics, air power, strategic airlift and sealift, intelligence capabilities 
and the others who possess the low-level power, and are responsible for the manpower 
intensive tasks, such as crisis management and peacekeeping with a high risk of 
casualties.79  Such a division of labor would create different concepts of risk and cost and 
would put the Alliance’s future and unity in serious jeopardy. 
The gap also intensifies another issue of conflict in the Alliance: burden-sharing.  
The inability of the European countries to contribute seriously to the most demanding 
operations could lead many people in the U.S. to criticize Europeans for their “unfair” 
unwillingness to spend more, while at the same time, many people in Europe might feel 
“humiliated” about that limited contribution, and by the same token, “humiliated” by 
their limited political influence.80      
C. NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Ten years after Maastricht, the EU must think again and must reorient its security 
and defense policy, as two new developments have emerged: enlargement and the 
changed nature of international violence.  The international arena has changed radically 
during the last decade, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001.  Where all 
these changes may be leading is not clear, and our attempts to impose security through 
intervention “can create backlashes which interact with complex globalization processes 
to create new sources of uncertainty: overlapping and competing cross-border networks 
of power, shifting loyalties and identities, and new sources of endemic low-level 
conflict.”81  The new security dilemma cannot be dealt with through the traditional 
approach of defense and security policy with clear-cut definitions of interests and threats 
and respective military instruments.  Nevertheless, the challenges of the new environment 
must be examined because of the effects they might have on regional or world order.82    
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However, if European Union nations want to become a strong and united polity, 
as Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission claims, a common ESDP 
will be necessary for them at a moment when clouds are gathering over the security of all 
the planet and the basic principles on which the international system is founded are likely 
to be called into question.  All the European nations have the obligation to deal with, and 
at least to try to find solutions to all the emerging problems, which are associated with 
their goal. 
These challenges include the lack of a unified command, the lack of satellite 
intelligence, absence of heavy lift, political disunity, non-nuclear weapons except for 
France and Great Britain, transatlantic relations with emphasis on the unique British-
American relationship and last, but not least, the failure of European countries to resolve 
the crises, such as the one in the former Yugoslavia, a failure that was primarily a result 
of an incoherent policy, and a lack of political cohesion among the EU member states. 
Political and military unity is necessary for the deployment of one common ESDP.  
D. PROPOSALS FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
Therefore, the first and foremost problem involves mainly the quality and not the 
quantity of the European defense spending, that is, with the way EU member states 
allocate their limited resources.  Since increased spending is not the solution, spending 
more efficiently is essential to changing the situation. 
In spite of the reductions in defense spending from 1985 to 2000 in the U.S., the 
gap between European and U.S. investments has widened since the 1970’s.  The U.S. is 
far ahead of its Allies in capabilities necessary for large-scale operations such as 
command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR), airlift and sealift.83 
As a result of that capabilities gap, the European Union defense structure on the 
threshold of the 21st century suffers from serious shortfalls.  These include insufficient air 
and sea transport to deploy forces, inadequate air-to-air refueling, a lack of precision-
strike weapons, a lack of all-weather offensive fighter capability, inadequate  
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reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities at the strategic and tactical level, insufficient 
deployable command and control, interoperable communications and finally, no 
expeditionary capabilities.84 
If the EU intends to find solutions to the fundamental reasons that have created 
the capabilities gap, an immediate solution certainly must be found concerning economic 
factors, as success depends on funding.  As noted above, the amount of money that the 
EU spends on defense is not negligible ($165 billion), but the problem is the way in 
which that money is spent.  Europeans must spend more wisely and according to their 
requirements.  Only if these funds are spent in the correct manner can the EU narrow that 
gap.  Of course, for the European politicians to convince their people of the need to spend 
more on defense when no obvious threat to Europe is apparent and when many great 
social problems demand urgent solutions is different.  An excellent chance for the 
European politicians could have been the events of 11 September.  It was an opportunity 
to persuade their people to support more expenditure on defense.  However, this did not 
happen and social issues, such as health systems, pensions, unemployment, and so forth 
continue to be the first priority for citizens and voters, with little attention paid to defense 
issues. 
Also, Europe confronts difficulties in defense spending due to its demographics. 
By 2040, the U.S. will overtake the EU in population, and by 2050, the EU’s population 
could be 360 million and falling, while the U.S. population would be over 550 million 
and rising, contrary to the fact that only one hundred years ago, Europe’s population was 
exactly double the U.S. population85.  As The Economist notes, “If Europeans are 
unwilling to spend what is needed to be full partners of the U.S. now, they will be even 
less likely to do more in 2050.”86 
Thus, it becomes less and less likely that the Europeans will decide to spend more 
on defense, if that requires cutting budgets from social programs.  
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Furthermore, a closer and more effective defense industrial cooperation is 
necessary as that factor could change a great deal, both in terms of economics and in the 
operational capabilities of European forces.  At this time, almost every country has 
national defense industries that are supported mainly for reasons of national 
independence and effectiveness.  Instead, more attention should be given to the sharing of 
demands, as more of the products from a defense industry are too costly for its own 
government to buy or to develop by itself.  Unfortunately, the result is duplication to a 
large extent, of industrial equipment and effort, procurement systems and equipment, and 
a lack of coordination in common policies, and without a doubt, higher costs.  This fact 
leads to the waste of large amounts of money, and simultaneously, the European defense 
industries are at a disadvantage in comparison to the corresponding U.S. defense 
industries.  
Finally, for the EU to be able to solve the capabilities gap in the long term, it will 
be necessary to invest more money in research and development (R&D).  Only in that 
manner can it be possible for the gap between the EU and the U.S. to become narrower.  
Today, the U.S. spends more than four times the European total on defense research and 
development, while 90% of the European investments in new military equipment come 
from the countries of France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain and the Benelux, and there is 
no indication that this will change in the immediate future.87    
E. CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude, every aspect of the ESDP is directly connected to the main question, 
“What kind of Europe do we want to establish?”  The European Union needs to decide 
whether it wants to exist or not as an appreciable international actor.  In case of a positive 
answer, the EU has to establish the common ESDP and to develop and improve European 
capabilities.  Without the ambition to play an important international role, and only with 
the EU member nations recognizing that the role can only be played together, the 
technical, military and financial obstacles in the way of a common defense policy will not 
be overcome.  
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Toward that end, the most important change required is psychological, meaning 
that without losing sight of the broader transatlantic or NATO dimension, European 
Union decision-makers have to think and act “European,” if they would like to increase 
EU capabilities, in terms of security and defense.88  Contrary to the belief of many 
Europeans that the hegemonic tendencies of the U.S. restrict the international role of the 
European Union, they have to understand that the main problem of the Union is its 
weakness and lack of ambition.  However, to achieve such a great change in this way of 
thinking is very difficult, as that change would not have many positive consequences 
either for sovereignty or for national defense industry.  The EU must define and declare 
its own strategic concept, but it is not necessary to cover exactly the same fields as the 
U.S. strategic concept.  The tendency to develop the ESDP does not mean that the 
European Union wants to create a competitor to NATO.  On the contrary, by improving 
its capabilities, the European pillar of NATO becomes stronger automatically.  
Facing the challenges of the third millennium, it is almost a moral obligation for 
the European Union to intervene in world affairs and to become a serious partner for the 
U.S. because an efficient ESDP would not only enhance the EU’s role in the world, but 
could also improve the transatlantic relationship.89  As Maartje Rutten has written,90 
The 11 September 2001 attacks have revealed the disparity and broadness 
of the threats at hand.  Those attacks have shown the vulnerability not only 
of the USA but also of the rest of the world.  Security and defense have 
become global concerns, and the EU has a responsibility to play a 
significant role in this respect. 
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V. GREECE AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
POLICY   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Greece as a European, Mediterranean, and a Balkan country has had its share of 
troubled history in South-East Europe but hopefully for the country, Greece, at the 
beginning of the 21st century is in a much better position than all its neighbors, 
economically, politically and socially. Consequently, Greece constitutes an important 
factor in the democratic and economic reform of the countries of Southeastern Europe as 
they stabilize the European security architecture.91  However, threats to Greek security, 
from the Balkans and in the east Mediterranean area, destabilize the area, which has been 
characterized as “the powder-keg of Europe.”  Challenges resulted from the disputes 
among the great powers for the best policies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.  
Under these circumstances, Greece is deeply anxious about its future and its sovereign 
rights and looks forward to safeguarding peace and stability.  Such a safeguarding can be 
achieved, in one sense, by establishing and deploying of a common European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
Therefore, clarifying Greece’s place in the new era, its geopolitical and 
geostrategic position, its national strategy, and the threats that confronts its international 
environment is crucial. The efforts being made that would allow Greece to participate in 
international organizations and in alliances contributing to international security must 
prevail. This is extremely vital to the future existence of Greece and to the development 
of a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).     
B. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
Ironically, the dissolution of the bipolar system and improved relations between 
the United States and Russia, the former two super powers, ushered in a new era. Yet it 
seems to be an era fraught with many regional conflicts. Previously the bipolar system 
contained such skirmishes, and the sudden collapse of that balance opened Pandora’s Box 
in many dangerous areas. 
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Therefore, the strategic environment continues to be dangerous and complicated.  
Even though the threat of a world war has decreased, tensions in ethnic, economic and 
environmental disputes continue to create instability in the international security system.  
The ambitious increase in regional powers, which have appeared in the areas of South 
East Asia and the Persian Gulf, could very possibly create serious problems for the 
international community.  Threats such as minority disputes, religious fundamentalism, 
international organized crime, illegal arms trade, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, 
mass refugee movements, and terrorism constitute a challenge to international peace and 
security.92 
All these radical changes in the security environment have totally befuddled 
Greece’s strategic situation.  By virtue of its position and economic strength in the 
Balkans, Greece has a key role in the development of European structures.  It also has a 
crucial role in strengthening and broadening European integration in the region.  Greece 
has an opportunity to become one of the significant factors and a creative force for peace 
and progress, both in Europe and in the international community, and it must grasp this 
unique historic chance.93 
Consequently, the regional challenges in and close to Europe must be resolved to 
create a wider European security system, and it is necessary to redefine the relations and 
the cooperation structure in the European Union in order to resolve matters of peace and 
security. 
C. THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE AND THE NEW CHALLENGES 
Today, the old European political order is no longer in force and a new order is 
starting to replace it.  The dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the crises that occurred 
afterward transformed the European structure.  In Europe, the usual social responsibilities 
of security, welfare and progress of every country can no longer be successful on a purely 
national basis, and international cooperation is necessary.  Integration will be the only 
solution for survival in the global community.  European nations have to grow together to 
form one of the most important unions in the world.  
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The end of the East-West conflict has shifted the political map of Europe, and 
through cooperation, the political weight of every European country is changing.  Old 
alliances are becoming insignificant and leading powers and roles are emerging. 
Europe faces new challenges while the end of the conflict between the East and 
West has been replaced by regional crises for social, ethnic, religious and economic 
reasons.  Even one possibility for war or civil war in Europe will call the entire new 
European structure into question, as well as the process toward a peaceful and stable 
continent.  Therefore, what is needed is not only political measures to promote stability 
among neighbors in Europe and to prevent new regional arms races, but mainly, a clear 
crisis and conflict management capability.94  These capabilities must be able to handle 
complex modern threats and crises in our era between rich and poor, problems from 
resource constraints, environmental problems and problems regarding weapons of mass 
destruction.     
1. The Geostrategic Position of Greece 
Greece is a southeastern European and Mediterranean country situated at a 
traditional crossing point of countries and civilizations, between East and West, North 
and South, in a sea area of enormous geopolitical importance.  Greece is the only country 
in the region to be a member of the EU, WEU and NATO.  Moreover, Greece is the 
remotest member state of the EU and the only country with no common borders with the 
other EU members, as well as the only orthodox Christian country in the European 
Union.   
In addition, Greece is located in a dangerous area of the Balkans, an area full of 
conflicts and tensions, which since 1989, has been in a state of flux and in a ceaseless 
nationalistic race.  However, Greece’s critical position in a fragile environment is not 
only because of the Balkans, but also because of the situation in the Middle East, where 
persistent hatred and violence could result in a free-for-all clash.  One other important 
factor that should not be ignored is that Greece is the only member state of the European 
Union that feels an intense external threat to its national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity from a neighboring country. 
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This unique location of Greece, as well as the distinctive geographic formation of 
the Hellenic territory, which combines a mainland with an extended coastline and more 
than 3,000 islands and rocky isles lends Greece a particular geostrategic character, 
rendering it as Europe’s gate to Asia and Africa.95  That distinct geostrategic importance 
of the area also explains the special security requirements of Greece.  From a geostrategic 
point of view, the Aegean Sea, in combination with the Greek mainland, exercises control 
over the sea lines of communication from and to the Black Sea and the Middle East to 
Southern Europe and Northern Africa. These are also the sea lines of energy, controlling 
the strategic raw materials to the West.96  The continental and island Greek territory, 
located at the critical meeting point of the three Continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
on the sea line of communication between the two crucial seas of the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean, and therefore of two oceans, the Atlantic and Indian oceans, constitutes a 
unified undividable defense area, characterized as a strategic area of global value and 
importance.97  As an example, the island of Crete, with its naval and air facilities and its 
central position in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, covers all directions and controls all 
sea lines from the Dardanelle to the Suez as well as the air lines from Western Europe to 
the Middle East. Only one simple confirmation of Greece’s geostrategic importance was 
the Gulf War in which it played a significant role in the transference of the armed forces 
and their supplies.  The same is true for the Thessalonica area, which comprised, without 
a doubt, a key point for the moving of peacekeeping forces to the region of Kosovo 
during the outbreak of nationalistic hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, the number of harbors, airfields and its road network make Greece an 
excellent support and operational base for military forces that would be able to operate in 
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2. The Concept of Greek Security and Defense Policy 
All these developments created new security conditions for Greece.  Today 
Greece is facing a particular security situation.99  Beyond the existing and apparent threat 
from the east, it also faces instability along the northern borders.  The entire focus of 
international security moves today from Central Europe and the outdated conflict 
between the East and West to the European periphery, and particularly, to the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East.100 
Greece must follow a strategy characterized by responsibility and consistency, 
with respect to international law, and with no claims over the territories of the 
neighboring small countries, due to their weakness to protect their countries. By far, the 
Greek policy and strategy of today is based on realistic assumptions. Of course, by not 
continuing that strategy, Greece might confront many serious problems with surrounding 
countries.  
Although acting under the universal law of right, “act externally in such a manner 
that the free exercise of thy will may be able to co-exist with the freedom of all others; 
according to a universal law,”101 sounds moral and just, but its application can be an 
extremely dangerous strategy for the interests of one’s country if the others do not follow 
this universal idea of Immanuel Kant. Nevertheless, it provides the normative measure 
for just relations between individual nations or, in other words, gives us a measure of 
how far away strategic arrangements might be falling short of this ideal.  
3. Greek National Strategy 
In particular, the Greek national strategy includes a few of the following 
fundamental principles:102 
• the defense of national independence, sovereignty and integrity of the 
country against any threat, and especially, against the threat of Turkey. 
Turkey remains the number one threat for Greece, with all convinced that 
it always has the ulterior motive of changing the status quo for the region, 
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• the support of the European leaning of the country, due to the concept of 
integration for the European Union in the same way that it attempts to 
make the country the most important pillar of the EU in the Balkans  
• the efficient function of the country as the metropolitan center of the 
Greek nation by taking the necessary initiatives for national motivation for 
every Greek citizen around the world whenever it is essential. 
In order for these national strategy goals to be successful, and especially due to 
the Turkish threat, which recently has become more offensive in nature for the first time 
with the making of demands, and even for territorial claims such as for the Imia/Kardak 
isles in the winter of 1996, Greece seeking means of securing its sovereignty. 
Greek policy is committed to peace and its first goal is to safeguard, to promote 
and to shape peace, both within Greece and in the international community.  As a result, 
the military doctrine of Greece is a defensive doctrine, oriented to face any external 
threat,103 and it is neither correct nor wise to forget that deterrence will be successful 
only when the combination of incentives and intimidation is plausible and existent. 
The most important concepts of the Greek national military strategy are defensive 
sufficiency, a flexible response and the capability to cover the joint defense area of 
Greece and Cyprus.104  Defensive sufficiency is not meant as an uncontrollable arms race 
but, on the contrary, the necessary quality of human resources and weapon systems and 
an attempt to maximize the “cost-efficiency” ratio.105  A flexible response means that in 
the case of a crisis, the Greek reaction should be appropriate, selective, fast and 
efficient.106  Instead of a black and white situation, a range of options will be available if 
Greece must react to a potential crisis instead of a black and white situation.  
As a last point concerning the national military strategy, in order to deter the 
Turkish threat, Greece and Cyprus decided to create a “Joint Defense Area”.  The 
implementation of this initiative is only defensive in nature and aims to deter or face any 
aggressive action against any of the participating countries.107  Furthermore, both 
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countries must understand that any deviation from that doctrine, in case of any dispute 
with Turkey, will automatically undermine the whole idea, and even the first time, will be 
the swan song for that, for their credibility and deterrence ability.    
In all these ways, Greece is trying, by itself, to reduce tension in the area by 
limiting armaments and enhancing of the regional institutions and structures of security, 
stability and cooperation.108  However, these attempts are not enough, have not always 
had the desired result, and Greece must find other means to be successful and to preserve 
peace.  
4. Problems with the Neighboring Countries 
In order to address this topic and to attempt to clarify the relations between 
Greece and Turkey, it is useful to refer to the bilateral and international issues that have 
troubled the two countries for many years to better understand the ongoing situation.  
The most important issue of all without a doubt is the Cyprus issue, the Turkish 
invasion and occupation of the island since that time of the northern part of the island.  
This happened with little international outcry, and proved that war can promote foreign 
policy objectives through other means, became a lasting impression on the military and 
diplomatic establishments, an immutable factor in Turkey’s policy-making.109  From then 
onward, the Turkish demands on Greece are always increasing.  A sense of self-worth in 
terms of size territory and population, military might and strategic value became the 
determining factor in Turkey’s view of its western neighbor and even moderate Turkish 
politicians, diplomats and analysts have not escaped the temptation of using power as the 
major criterion in resolving Greek-Turkish differences.110 
The Cyprus invasion, also, opened Pandora’s Box for Greek-Turkish disputes and 
one after another, the contested issues arose in quick succession.  Besides the Cyprus 
issue, many other disputes created serious tensions between the two countries, for  
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instance, the Aegean continental shelf, the control of air traffic over the sea; and the 
allocation of operational responsibility of the Aegean and its air space within the 
framework of NATO.111   
Greece does not accept the validity of all the disputes that Turkey has created for 
the benefit of its claims. Most of its objections must be brought to the International Court 
of Justice, since some of them are obviously legal questions.  However, contrary to that 
policy, Turkey refuses to accept international litigation on any issue and continues to 
assume all the problems as bilateral for a very clear reason - all the Turkish claims have 
no basis either in International Law nor in international practice and they are convinced 
that such a development would only negatively impact its interests.  According to Greek 
perceptions, Turkey is forever burdening the agenda with new claims so that if bilateral 
negotiations were to occur, it would be on Turkish demands only and advantageous to its 
positions.112  It is obviously an extremely preposterous ploy.  
Pressure from countries in the international community for Greece to submit to 
bilateral discussions with Turkey on the basis of an agenda with no Greek input and no 
Greek demands will inevitably lead to a conflict that will destabilize both neighboring 
countries for years to come and will ultimately destroy Turkey’s European prospects.113 
Likewise, along the northern borders of Greece, the existing economic 
uncertainty, political instability and statutory changes may require a long period of time 
to overcome.  After the wars that took place in the greater territory of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the entire region continues to be characterized by great 
instability, and a possible deterioration of the situation may cause serious problems in the 
structure of Balkan security and stability.114   
The role of Greece in the area is to reinforce the political and peace procedures to 
resolve the existing disagreements, and to promote, and eventually to establish peace,  
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security and stability.  Such a role will eliminate all possible threats to Greece and will 
have a beneficial impact on Greek security, protection and prosperity, which certainly are 
the first priorities of every country. 
5. Greece in International Organizations 
Under these circumstances, Greece, trying to protect and secure its territory 
against all threats in the Balkan area, has been a member of the most important alliances 
and organizations and its policy in the Balkans is guided by the principles of respect of 
international borders, stability, peace and security as well as by fully respecting human 
and minority rights. 
As Hans Morgenthau states in his book Politics Among Nations, alliances are the 
most important manifestation of the balance of power115 and it is evident that Greece, as 
not being a superpower, militarily or economically, must rely, parallel with its power, 
upon help from its allies concerning disputes that were always thrust into the 
international arena.  
Therefore, Greece today is a member of the UN (United Nations), of the NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization), of the EU (European Union), of the WEU (Western 
European Union), of the Council of Europe (COE) and of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the ulterior motive of preserving its national 
integrity and establishing of peace and democracy among all nations. 
Certainly, participation in these international defense organizations entails not 
only rights but also obligations for the members.  Every member has the obligation to 
contribute to peace support missions with personnel from the Armed Forces, with the 
primary goal of implementing international law and compliance with that rule.  
Greece is participating in all the missions of those organizations and has made 
essential and definite contributions to all these activities, from the Gulf War to Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Kosovo Wars.  Of course, one prerequisite for participation is the 
existence of a clear mandate prior to the formation of the force as well as the definition of 
the rules and the concepts of operations.116 
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Unfortunately, the participation of Greece in all these organizations and the 
indisputable contribution to global promotion of peace have not helped the country solve 
the existing disputes with Turkey.  Even the huge and thorny question of Cyprus and the 
occupation of one-third of the island has not resulted in a just and legal solution. 
In spite of the common belief that the international community would solve the 
issue if it really wanted a solution, nothing has changed over the last thirty years, except a 
few resolutions of condemnation from the UN Security Council for that abhorrent and 
illegal act from Turkey against an independent country, against Cyprus.  The example of 
Kuwait in 1991 was in almost the same situation, yet the entire international community 
rallied to the support of that weak country against the invader, Iraq. 
6. Greece and European Union 
Furthermore, this year 2003 will be a milestone year in the history of the EU.  Ten 
new member states will be joining forces with the present fifteen, in one of the most 
courageous steps toward realizing the goals set by the Union's founders, namely peace 
and prosperity through an extensive European integration.  A new era is dawning, which 
finds Europe stronger and ready to meet new challenges.  In this context, the Treaty of 
Nice goes into force while the discussion on the future of Europe is reaching its climax, 
and the European Union is about to draft a fundamental text, of constitutional character, 
that will enshrine the principles on which European nations have relied and the new 
objectives for Europe.  At the same time, the Greek Presidency is expected to unfold in a 
particularly volatile and unpredictable global environment.  The emergences of new 
factors in shaping the international balance, the existence of international terrorism, 
organized crime and, more generally, the development of forces that are not subject to 
any institutional control or discipline, create a climate of marked uncertainty worldwide.  
The Greek Presidency needs to remain extremely vigilant in order to handle crises that 
may arise and must also be ready to tackle major challenges such as:117 
• Fighting international terrorism and organized crime (Iraq, North Korea, 
Al Queda).  Recent experience has shown that the fight against 
international terrorism is a complex process with many dimensions: 
military, economic, political and cultural.  A global strategy should aim at 
combating both the symptoms and causes of this phenomenon. 
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• Given the current economic slowdown, improving the climate of 
confidence and investment, increasing productivity, levels of employment 
and fiscal stability are all objectives of critical importance.  
• The challenge of “sustainable development” on a global scale that can 
contribute to eradicating poverty and destitution and bridge growing 
socio-economic inequalities while, at the same time, protecting the 
environment and safeguarding ecosystems.  
• Reaffirming the role of international law and international institutions and 
promoting a new, democratic governance model, in the light of 
globalization. 
This situation of uncertainty and the major challenges that Europe faces make it 
imperative for the European nations to strengthen and to restore the European citizen's 
feeling of security, as a primary and all-encompassing objective.  Whether this involves 
fighting terrorism and organized crime, controlling the flow of immigration, protecting 
workers' health and safety, ensuring the viability of pension schemes, or food safety and 
consumer protection, the European Union must reestablish a climate of security and 
confidence.  This is precisely the goal that most of the undertakings included in the Greek 
Presidency's program will strive to achieve.  With regard to the European Security and 
Defense Policy, the basic priority of the Hellenic Presidency is the finalization of all 
those outstanding issues that will allow the realization of the European Union's full 
operational capability in the field of comprehensive crisis management during 2003, 
through the balanced development of both the civilian and military aspects and the 
advancement of civil-military coordination.   
The Greek Presidency takes place at a time of critical change in Europe and new 
challenges in the field of Security and Defense Cooperation, an area in which the Union 
is trying to forge a new identity.  In a period when the EU will be engendering the 
greatest enlargement in its history, the Union will be called upon to reconsider the 
context of its relations with its new neighbors and promote policies reflecting the new 
situation in Europe.  In this light, the promotion of the EU's relations with the Balkan 
countries will be a foremost priority for the Greek Presidency.   
The effective development and deepening of relations with Russia will also 
constitute an important parameter in the EU's efforts to consolidate peace, stability and 
cooperation in Europe.  Relations with the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, as well as the 
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Caucasus region, acquire a special significance in this new European reality.  At the same 
time, the strengthening of the EU's cooperation with Mediterranean countries will be a 
major task for the Greek Presidency.  The Greek Presidency will promote political 
dialogue with all groups of countries.  It will give special emphasis to the respect of 
human rights and the rule of law.  It will seek closer cooperation between the Union and 
the U.S. in the fight against inequality, the proliferation of nuclear and chemical 
weapons, armaments control and conflict prevention.  It will also aim at a more active 
participation of the EU in the international community's fight against terrorism, 
promoting the development of capabilities and policies and supporting multilateral 
cooperation with third countries and international organizations, with the goal of 
eradicating this scourge, which has developed into a major international problem 
following September 11, 2001.   
At the same time, it will strive for stronger policies for combating poverty, 
protecting the environment, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
resolving regional conflicts and facing the problem of drug trafficking.  The Greek 
Presidency's immediate priorities include the strengthening of relations with the U.S. and 
cooperation at all levels, so as to form a joint response to international challenges. 
European citizens expect the Union to respond to its international responsibilities, by 
preventing international conflicts and managing crises when they occur.  The Greek 
Presidency will endeavor to strengthen the EU's capacity for effective political 
intervention in conflict areas, by improving and further developing existing institutional 
instruments such as common strategies and joint actions.  At a time when the EU is trying 
to build new capabilities in the field of Security and Defense Cooperation, the Greek 
Presidency will pursue its efforts in order to reinforce the institutional framework of the 
CFSP, by creating the area of “Freedom, Security and Justice.”  As the Greek Prime 





we want and we will try to strengthen the common foreign policy and the 
defense and security policy in order to upgrade the EU’s role in the 
international scene. That establishment will overcome the present-day 
phenomena of insecurity and by that way; we can build a tomorrow of 
hope and progress for everyone.118 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Foreign policy is often based upon selfish interests and cultural bias and not 
morality or international law.  The Great Powers consider Turkey to be more important 
and consistent with their strategic interests than Cyprus, so they do not want to disturb 
one “loyal” friend and ally, even if history, such as in WWI and WWII, has taught 
everyone dissimilar lessons about Turkey’s stance against the international democratic 
society.  Today, it is evident that realistic ideas prevail in the international arena and 
legality and morality are followed and referred to only when they are consistent with 
Western interests.  However, one must not forget that the concept of international legality 
being the common good is of profound importance in all aspects of international 
relations, even if it has been constantly ignored by the powerful all throughout history.119 
To put it another way, Greece believes in the creation and existence of the 
European Security and Defense Policy, as it will be the only protective force against a 
possible attack from Turkey, according to the concept of collective defense.  Even NATO 
has avoided taking a clear stand concerning its attitude on the hypothetical situation in 
which another member of the alliance attacks one country, a member of the alliance.  
Greece believes that the existence of the European Security and Defense Policy will have, 
at the minimum, the result of intimidating Turkey and preventing any aggressive attitude 
against Greece and Cyprus.  The common foreign and defense policy of the European 
Union should be an effective system to resolve crises, as well as a collective system that 
would guarantee peace, stability and security.  Developing of that common policy should 
strengthen the security of all member states, protect borders, and defend the vital interests 
of each member state and the entire European Union. 
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Furthermore, taking into consideration the European dimension of Greece the 
support of the European Security and Defense Policy is necessary.  The ESDP creation is 
imperative for a united Europe with a common parliament, a common currency and a 
common defense and security policy.  Creating a genuine security community would be 
the greatest achievement in the remarkable process that the theoreticians call “European 
integration.”120  A main goal is the deployment of an army with a purely European 
identity, a goal to which there are many objections, which would not clash with NATO.  
On the contrary, the European Security and Defense Policy would be coordinate and 
cooperate with the security and defense policy within the context of NATO.  
Greece believes that the new NATO, the expanded NATO, will constitute the best 
possible guarantee for peace in the Balkans and Europe, since it will be the credible entity 
to cover the “void of power” that was created by the collapse of the bipolar system.121  
Equally, NATO assumes that Europe can and must establish, under a complementary and 
not competitive spirit, its European Security and Defense Policy, its military industry and 
its multinational, rapid reaction, effective troops. In the case that a future U.S. 
government wants to resign from European affairs, Europe cannot remain without 
protection.  
Finally to conclude, Greece, because of the particularities of the threats it faces 
and of its geopolitical position, is obliged to participate in building an army with a 
European defense identity, within the EU.  Greece is obliged to play a positive role in 
structuring its own strategy and goals.  The future of the European Union, with the 
prospect of the forthcoming enlargement to 25 member states, is an issue of fundamental 
interest for the Greek Presidency.  Greece has always believed that the Union's 
enlargement should be linked to deepening European unification.  The enlarged Union 
should evolve into an institutional system capable of making effective decisions with a 
democratic and social content. 
Greece’s policy is based on the realization that its national interests are best 
served by stability and democracy in the Balkans and in the same way, its modernization 
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and its deterrent power through the ESDP is the best guarantee to develop and to secure 
the prosperity of the country.  Therefore, establishing and developing the ESDP, which 
by extension would be considered a “Greek Army,” would contribute to the one and only 
physiognomy of the EU and to the construction of the Europe of the 21st century.  The 
above thoughts comprise the aspirations of most Greeks.  As T. S. Eliot said: “History 
deceives us by whispering ambitions, guides us by vanities.”122  In other words, 
examining history, ambitions and vanities tend to make any “reasonable” predictions or 
assumptions a most frustrating task. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The European Security and Defense Policy is only a part of the much broader plan 
concerning the future of Europe and the European Union.  It also greatly concerns the 
issue of what kind of Europe we want to establish for the future.  EU members 
participating in the ESDP agree on the need to improve their military capabilities as well 
as to make them more effective.  
However, given that the deadline for the Headline Goal is fast approaching, the 
doubts of many of the participating countries have become greater and greater concerning 
how they can improve their military capabilities as an outcome to all these problems.  
The desired goal for the entire operation is improving military capabilities in conjunction 
with coordinated NATO-EU decision-making structures.  This is the most desirable 
outcome for the EU, NATO and the United States. The ESDP will be successful and the 
European Union will be able to handle security challenges on its own, without direct help 
from the United States, and at the same time, the United States will still be influential in 
European affairs through NATO. 
The European Union, by developing its military capabilities, would strengthen its 
position and its international political power.  The ability for the European Union to 
speak with only one voice would change its position in international relations forever, 
making the European Union an equivalent member of international politics. 
Furthermore, a joint declaration adopted by both the European Union and NATO 
on December 16, 2002 opened the way for closer political and military cooperation 
between the two organizations with no contrary or antagonistic policies in the areas of 
crisis management and conflict prevention.  Furthermore, the political principles for EU-
NATO cooperation were outlined and gave the European Union access to NATO’s 
planning and logistic capabilities for its own military operations.123  The European Union 
and NATO declared that their relationship will be founded on principles such as  
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partnership, effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation, transparency, equality, 
and respect for the interests of the member states as well as for the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations.124 
The members of the European Union responded in unison to the terror attacks in 
the U.S. on September 11th even paradoxically according to the disagreements and 
disputes among them. These attacks reminded everyone that insecurity had become 
globalized, and does not discriminate among countries.  Almost all Western leaders 
expressed their immediate and unconditional support for the U.S. through communiqués 
and press releases.  
The EU expressed “its complete solidarity with the government of the United 
States and the American people at its terrible time and extended its deepest sympathy to 
all the victims and their families.”125  Another declaration that day announced that the 
EU would  
make every possible effort to ensure that those responsible for these acts 
of savagery are brought to justice and punished.  The US administration 
and the American people can count on our complete solidarity and full 
cooperation to ensure that justice is done.  We will not, under any 
circumstances, allow those responsible to find refuge, wherever they may 
be.  Those responsible for hiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.126 
Unfortunately, that hopeful and promising message was replaced by major 
disputes and among the Unites States and the countries of the European Union 
concerning the war against Iraq.  Absolutely different approaches regarding Iraq emerged 
within the allies in NATO as well as within the members of the European Union.  
Two major and different approaches occurred.  One was supported mainly by the 
United States and the United Kingdom while the other was supported mainly by France 
and Germany.  The first approach argued that military conflict and intervention would be 
the only possible solution to the problems of Iraq’s regime and weapons of mass 
destruction.  The second argued that a policy of an extended system of containment 
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would be the desired solution before any military action occurred.  That policy would 
combine increased weapons inspections, over flights by spy planes throughout Iraq and 
the insertion of thousands of UN peacekeepers virtually to occupy the country.  There 
were divisions across the Atlantic and disagreements within Europe that were symptoms 
of the deep divergence between those who believed that Iraq’s time was up and those 
who wanted an extended system of containment.127 
The outcome of history was not so encouraging for the European Union and for a 
common stance among the EU members.  The common declaration from the eight 
European countries of Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, who did not respect the institutions of the EU, and five EU 
members, who torpedoed the common European policy on the issue of war against Iraq, 
created a direct threat of driving a wedge between the EU.  As the French newspaper 
Liberation wrote under the main title “Vassals, Europe is the first adjacent loss of the war 
against Iraq.”128  Also, for many people everywhere, the debate over the war against Iraq 
had as its first victim the European Union and its aspirations to become a global actor and 
its co-called “common” European Security and Defense Policy.  According to them, the 
issue of Iraq revealed all the limits that this policy contains within, as member states of 
the EU simply pursued national policies and interests, leaving the EU on the sidelines.  
World policies have been decided elsewhere, and action on common European foreign, 
security and defense policies have been restricted to their traditional, narrowly defined 
playgrounds.129  It became clear to everyone with regards to this issue, the three major 
Western pillars, the European Union, NATO and the UN Security Council, that they have 
already been shaken and that too much effort would be required by all members to 
change the situation and have relations return as they were before.  
However, the reactions that arose because of the comments of Secretary of 
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, about “old and new Europe” were full of anger.  The 
Secretary of Defense declared on January 22, 2003:  
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Now, you are thinking as Germany and France.  I don’t.  I think that’s old 
Europe.  If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of 
gravity is shifting to the east.  And there are a lot of new members.  And if 
you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who 
have been invited in recently, what is it?  Twenty-six, something like that?  
You are right.  Germany has been a problem, and France has been a 
problem.130 
Even though significant efforts have been made between the European nations, 
even with the spirited attempts by Greece, which was the presidential country of EU at 
that time, no agreement has been achieved on Iraq, and as the Greek Alternate Foreign 
Minister, Tassos Yiannitsis, briefed the European Parliament in Strasbourg, he noted that 
the EU’s identity was at stake.  
The issue of Iraq the danger of its using weapons of mass destruction or 
the regional balance of power, really concerns the EU.  At stake are the 
credibility of the EU, its interests, its role and its potential.  We must 
answer the question as to whether we will be able to bridge our 
differences.  My answer is that I do not know if we can but that we have 
the duty to make the effort. And we have a duty to exhaust all possibilities 
to achieve this.131 
ESDP probably in the future will be a reality but it is undoubtedly a long-term 
process.  The enlargement of the European Union will make the situation more difficult 
as a consensus among them will be extremely rare.  In addition, the intergovernmental 
method that governs the common foreign, security and defense policies is the best 
guarantee that national interests will prevail.  
Of course, according to the Athens declaration on April 16, 2003 concerning the 
enlargement of EU to 25 member states, that was a historic day for Europe as the 
divisions in Europe after the World War II eventually reached an end.  However, 
challenges remain and as President Chirac of France said, “this new Europe will not meet 
the expectations of its citizens, as the recent crisis showed, if it does not clarify its 
political ambitions and reform its functions radically.”132 
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However, despite the great aspirations and expectations for the ESDP operations 
in the near future, the EU needs to approach any given mission with extreme caution and 
skepticism.  Many people in the EU are afraid that the very early deployment of the EU 
forces, according to the schedule of Headline Goal, could lead to failure, and very 
possibly have catastrophic consequences for any future deployment of the ESDP.  These 
thoughts are not very far removed from reality, and pertaining to many difficulties, 
disagreements and concerns that have been expressed from a large number of the member 
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